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IN THE UTAH COURT

; APPEALS

WALTER SCOTT HANSEN and
KRISTI D, HANSEN,
Plaintiffs and Appellees,

Case No. 950231-CA

CRAIG OBERG and DIANE OBERG,

Argument Priority Nc

15

Defendants and Appellants, |
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY, STATE
OF UTAH, HONORABLE DAVID L. MOWER PRESIDING
BRIEF OF APPELLEES
JURISDICTION'
This

appeal

is

from, a

final

judgment

of

the

Sixth

• Judicial District Court in and for Sanpete County, State of Utah,
tL- .-_:. . :. .-. „ .-.

")wer presiding, entered November 22, :i 994

This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2) (k) and pi irsuant to the order of the
Utah Supreme Court dated March 3] , 1995, transferring this matter
from the Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals for disposition.
.' STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
STATEMENT

Hansens

do

not

0F

dispute

ISSUES
Obergs'

statement

insofar as they relate to Obergs' challenge
Findings of Fact

of

i ssues

to Judge Mower's

As discussed more fully below, however, Hansens

disagree with Obergs' claim that their appeal raises issues of law
for disposition by this Court.
In addition, the content of Obergs' brief has given rise
to another issue:

Whether Obergs have marshalled the evidence in

support of Judge Mower's Findings of Fact, as required by Rule
52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the case law decided
thereunder.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue No. 1
The standard of review is governed by Rule 52 (a) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which states in part, "Findings of
Fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be
set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of
the witnesses."

The "clearly erroneous" standard applies whether

the case is one in equity or one at law.

Barker v. Francis, 741

P.2d 548 (Ut. App. 1987).
The trial court's conclusions of law are reviewed for
correctness, granting no particular deference.

Carter v. Hanrath,

885 P.2d 801 (Ut. App. 1994).
Issue No, 2
The reviewing court will affirm the trial court's ruling
"absent an abuse of discretion". Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188,
and if proper "will affirm the trial court's ruling absent an abuse
of discretion".

Baldwin v. Burton, supra, at 1198.
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATION
Regarding issue of boundary by acquiescence and
challenges to the Trial Court's Findings of Fact:

Defendants'

Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides, in
relevant part:
Findings of Fact . . . shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall
be given to the opportunity of the Trial Court
to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
Regarding the award of attorney's fees:
Utah Code Annotated § 78-27-56 provides:
(1) In civil actions, the court shall
award
reasonable
attorney's
fees
to
a
prevailing party if the court determines that
the action or defense to the action was
without merit and not brought or asserted in
good faith, except under Subsection (2) .
(2) The court, in its discretion, may
award no fees or limited fees against a party
under Subsection (1), but only if the court:
(a) finds the party has filed an
affidavit of impecuniosity in the action
before the court; or
(b) the court enters in the record
the reason for not awarding fees under the
provisions of Subsection (1).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and
Disposition in the Court Below
This case presents a simple contest between Plaintiffs,
Walter Scott Hansen and Kristi D. Hansen (hereinafter referred to
as

"Hansens"), who claim title to real property by their deed,

title of record and possession, and Defendants, Craig Oberg and

-3-

Diane Oberg (hereinafter referred to as "Obergs"), who claim title
under a theory of boundary by acquiescence.
A two-day trial was held before the Honorable Judge
David L. Mower, who entered oral findings from the bench and then
took the matter under advisement (Tr. 453, 463).
The Court issued its Findings of Fact and Decision on or
about September 21, 1994, and directed Hansens" attorney to prepare
a Judgment and Order that would conform to its decision (R. 181).
The Court ruled in Hansens' favor and found that Obergs
had promised to move the fence in the future when the Hansens
developed their property

(R. 179, 196), that there never was a

boundary between the parties' property that met the requirements
under a theory of boundary by acquiescence

(R. 197) , that the

Obergs had trespassed upon the Hansens' property (R. 197), and that
the Hansens were entitled to an award of attorney's fees (R. 180,
181 and 198).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

Introduction
Hansens take issue with Obergs' statement of facts.

It

is misleading because it is very selective and omits much of the
evidence at trial that is pertinent to the findings of fact they
challenge.

Obergs have completely failed to marshal the evidence

in support of Judge Mower's Findings of Fact, as required under
Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The requirement to

marshal the evidence is discussed more fully in the "Argument"
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section below.

Obergs' statement of facts is thus nothing more

than a recital of the evidence that Obergs believe would support
their claim against Hansens.
While

Obergs'

failure

to

marshal

the

evidence

is

sufficient by itself to warrant dismissal of this appeal, Hansens
will nonetheless set forth below a summary of the ample evidence
that supports Judge Mower's Decision and the Findings of Fact.
Hansens have summarized the facts and have also summarized the
pertinent testimony of each witness who testified at trial.

To

assist the Court, the witnesses and their roles are identified
briefly below.
Witness or Party

Role

Walter Scott Hansen

Plaintiff,
Parcel 107

current

Oscar Deloy Peterson

Prior owner of parcel 107

Jack L. Peterson

Prior owner of parcel 107

Steve L. Ludlow

Surveyor

Thomas LaVeal Hansen

Plaintiff s father

Merrill Ogden

Abstractor

Craig Oberg

Defendant,
parcel 105

Robert Sevy

Prior owner of parcel 107

Earl Livinston

Employee of Defendant
who built fence

Ted Peterson

Neighbor of Defendant who has
lived near parcels 105 and 107
since 1948

Don Christensen

Defendant's father-in-law

current

owner

owner

of

of

Wayne Sevy
B.

Prior owner of Lot 107

Summary of Testimony
The testimony of the trial witnesses is summarized below.

This summary is not intended to be an exhaustive statement of all
the testimony, but rather a summary of the evidence that supports
Judge Mower's Findings of Fact.

As such, it constitutes the

"marshalling of the evidence" that Obergs should have incorporated
in their brief.

The evidence overwhelmingly supports the Findings

of Fact and the judgment in Hansens' favor.
Walter Scott Hansen
Walter Hansen, a Plaintiff in this action, purchased
parcel 107 from Jack Lou Peterson, etux, in August of 1990.
After he purchased the property, he improved the property
and placed a mobile home where he, his wife and four children live.
(Tr. 15-16) .x
At

the time Hansen purchased

the property,

Peterson

showed him the southernmost boundary as beginning in the middle of
Cottonwood Creek and running directly west.

The old fence was on

the north side of the creek, was in disrepair and was overgrown
with a lot of foliage.

(Tr. 16-17).

Oberg called Hansen two days after he moved into his
mobile home in August of 1990 and asked him if he was interested in

References to the record other than the trial transcript will
be referred to herein as R.
, indicating the page number of the
record. References to the trial transcript will be referred to as
Tr.
, indicating the page number of the transcript.
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selling the now disputed property, to which Hansen replied in the
negative.

During this conversation with Oberg, there was no

discussion concerning the old fence nor did Oberg make any claim of
entitlement to or ownership of the disputed property, although
Hansen told Oberg of how Peterson had identified the boundary.
(Tr. 18-19).
Hansen had another conversation, in May of 1991, after
Obergs' horse had trampled Hansens' newly planted grass.

They

discussed putting up a fence together, and again Oberg made no
claim to the disputed property.

(Tr. 20-21).

In March or April of 1992, Oberg built an irrigation pond
50-70 yards to the northwest of Hansens' parcel 107.

Hansen

complained to Oberg about the pond concerning safety issues with
his children and other neighborhood children.

Oberg responded by

building a fence around his pond but stopped at the northwest
corner of Hansens' parcel 107.

(Tr. 29-32).

Hansen stated that his children played on both sides of
the old fence and built huts and little play areas from the time he
moved in, in August of 1990 to August of 1992. Oberg never stopped
them or complained they were on his property.

(Tr. 34 and 35).

In August of 1992, while Hansen was away to the Utah
National Guard Summer Camp, Oberg had his employees build the fence
that ran more or less where the old fence had been.
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(Tr. 35).

Hansen did not recall ever seeing Oberg do any repairs to
the

old

fence

prior

to

the

construction

of

the

new

fence.

(Tr. 34).
Oberg and Hansen had a conversation in August of 1993,
after this lawsuit was filed, and Oberg said he would move the
fence when Hansen was ready to develop his property.

(Tr. 36-38) .

Oscar Delov Peterson
Oscar Peterson testified that he purchased parcel 107 in
April of 1980 from Robert Sevy.

Mr. Sevy took him to the property

with his brother Jack Peterson.

Mr. Sevy showed him the southern-

most boundary line to be on the south side of Cottonwood Creek and
identified the fence line which Obergs claim to be the boundary by
acquiescence as "the pig fence that we put up."

(Tr. 46-52).

Mr. Peterson stated that there was not much of a fence
and that during the three years that he owned the property he never
saw Oberg do any repairs to the fence, nor did Oberg ever make a
claim to the property.

(Tr. 49, 52 and 61) .

Peterson always

considered the boundary of the property to be where Robert Sevy had
showed him, not the old fence.

(Tr. 57).

During his ownership,

Mr. Peterson chased children off the disputed parcel, cut a rope
out of a tree on the parcel, and pruned the trees thereon.

(Tr.

55) . He used the disputed property "no more than the rest of the
property that I'd bought."

(Tr. 58).

Just before Mr. Peterson sold parcel 107 to his brother,
he

recalled

Oberg

putting

up

a
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fence

on

the

south

side

of

Cottonwood Creek, made of green posts and wire on the approximate
boundary line that Mr. Sevy had shown to him when he purchased the
property.

(Tr. 52-56, and see Exhibit #25).
Mr. Peterson recalls Oberg putting horses on parcel 105

but that the horses were tethered to a stake by a rope.

(Tr. 58) .

Jack Lou Peterson
Jack Peterson is the brother of Oscar Deloy Peterson, and
he purchased parcel 107 from Oscar in 1983.
Mr.
Mr. Robert

Peterson

Sevy

when

remembers
his

brother

going

to

purchased

the

property

the

with

property

recalled the boundaries described as Oscar Peterson testified.

and
He

understood the boundary with parcel 105 was south of the creek.
(Tr. 80-81) .
Peterson testified that Oberg had a fence built on the
south side of Cottonwood Creek that was constraining livestock
Oberg had on parcel 105.

The fence Oberg had on parcel 105 was on

the approximate boundary line as had been described by Mr. Sevy.
(Tr. 81 and 82).
Peterson recalls Oberg placing "No Trespassing" signs on
fences around parcel 105 but not on the old fence.

(Tr. 85 and

88) .
Steve Ludlow
Steve Ludlow is a registered engineer and land surveyor
who surveyed parcels 105 and 107, marked as Exhibit #26, in June,
1992.

(Tr. 101, 104).
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Ludlow testified that he found no gaps or overlaps for
parcels 105 and 107 and that the deeded descriptions matched up
with what he found on the ground pursuant to his survey.

(Tr. 99-

101 and 117).
Ludlow

described

the

disputed

property

as

having

considerable amount of over-growth and saw no older fence.

a

(Tr.

118 and 121).
Ludlow measured 99.74 feet inside Oberg's fences whereas
his deeded description called for 66 feet.

(Tr. 120).

Thomas LaVeal Hansen
Tom Hansen is the father of the Plaintiff, has lived in
Ephraim for 57 years

(Tr. 137) , and owns a business across the

street south from the subject parcels.
Mr. Tom Hansen recalled the conversation between Oberg
and his son in August of 1990 at which time Oberg pointed out the
boundary line and made no claim to the disputed property.

(Tr. 143

and 144).
Mr. Hansen testified that the Plaintiff, Kristi Hansen,
called him to help her get Oberg's men off their property, i.e.,
make them stop building the new fence and quit cutting down the
trees.

(Tr. 146, 159) .
Mr. Hansen and his other son, Kenny, took pictures of the

damage done to the property and of the new fence.
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(Tr. 147-159) .

Merrill Ogden
Merrill Ogden is a registered abstractor and licensed
title insurance agent in the State of Utah.
Ogden

testified

that

he

ran

a title

search

on

the

property back fifty years and found no overlapping descriptions or
gaps on the property.

(Tr. 177).

Ogden found that parcels 105 and 107 were commonly owned
from the 1950's until March of 1970, when Hespert Sevy deeded
parcel 107 to his son, Kenneth Sevy.

(Tr. 178, 187).

Ogden found a Decree Quieting Title marked as Exhibit 27
for parcel 105.

(Tr. 178-183).

Parcels 105 and 107 have had distinct and separate legal
descriptions since 1877.
Craig Oberg
Craig Oberg is a Defendant and purchased the property in
1977 from Kenneth Sevy and moved to Ephraim in 1978.

(Tr. 194 and

195) .
Oberg testified there was an old fence on the disputed
area that "wasn't all that great" and that there was a lot of
growth and vegetation on the old fence.

(Tr. 216, 221).

Oberg testified that when his employees built the new
fence on Hansens' property they removed a lot of trees and bushes.
(Tr. 241) .
Oberg testified that he thought Beck had built the fence.
(Tr. 245).
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Oberg testified that he, like everybody else, does not
know why the old fence was placed in its location.

(Tr. 271 and

272) .
Oberg testified that he has never told anybody that the
disputed property was his.

(Tr. 272 and 273).

Oberg testified that he will lose no ground if the Court
decides the boundary is the survey line and that the ground has no
monetary value to him.

(Tr. 276 and 277).

Oberg agreed that he had discussed the option to move the
fence he had constructed on Hansens' property at a later date.
(Tr. 278 and 279) .
It should be noted that Obergs cite Tr. 282 as Craig
Oberg's testimony that he believed he was constructing the new
fence on the property line.

There is no such testimony on that

page or any nearby page.
Robert Sevy
Robert Sevy is a prior owner of parcel 107. He received
the property from his father, Hespert Sevy, who also owned parcel
105 at the time.

(Tr. 292 and 293) .

Robert Sevy testified that he did not care where the
fence was because his family owned the other parcel 105.

(Tr. 297

and 298) . Obergs cite Tr. 291 as support for the claim that Robert
Sevy understood

the old

fence was the boundary.

testimony is far less certain, as follows:
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The

actual

Q
What did you understand the south and
west boundaries to be when you were given the
property?
A
Well, I never really thought about it
until this come up, and I just always figured
the fence line was -- I never had any worry
about it. . . .
Q
So was it your opinion during the time
that you owned that piece of ground, parcel
107, that the fence constituted the boundary
line?
A
I never even thought about it.
I just
knew there was a fence there. (Tr. 291-292) .
Sevy testified that he sold the property by the deed to
Oscar Deloy Peterson.

(Tr. 2 98) . Mr. Sevy made no mention of the

fence during the sales transaction.
Sevy testified that he built pig pens on parcel 107 and
watered the pigs out of Cottonwood Creek on the other side of the
old fence.

(Tr. 300 and 301).

Sevy testified that when his father owned both parcels
105 and 107 that the farm animals could roam over both parcels at
will because the fence had not been repaired.

(Tr. 301-302) .

Sevy testified that the predecessors in interest (Beck
and

Sevy) who owned both parcels repaired

livestock

away

from

Mrs. Beck's

house.

the

fence

(Tr. 303

to keep

and 304).

Further, that after Mrs. Beck died, the fence was not repaired and
his father, Hespert Sevy, a predecessor in title to both parcel 105
and 107, let his livestock roam at will over both parcels.
316, 319).
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(Tr.

Earl Livinston
Oberg's employee who built the new fence on the Hansen
property. Livinston testified that Plaintiff's father, Tom Hansen,
told them they were trespassing and to quit building the fence.
(Trial Transcript and 322-323).
Livinston testified that when they began to build the new
fence, that the old fence was in disrepair and in pretty bad shape.
(Tr. 324) .
Livinston testified that they had to cut down two trees
on Hansens' property in order to build the new fence.

(Tr. 329).

Ted Peterson
Neighbor of Oberg who has lived on the same street as
subject property since 1948.
Has cleaned Cottonwood Creek and utilized water shares
out of the creek.

(Tr. 341).

Peterson testified that he observed livestock wandering
over parcels 105 and 107 while it was owned by Hespert Sevy that
the livestock could roam and use the whole piece.

(Tr. 348).

Peterson testified that when he cleaned Cottonwood Creek
in the 1940's and 50's the fence between parcels 105 and 107 was a
worn out, torn down fence and poorly maintained.

(Tr. 3 51 and

352) .
Don Christensen
Father-in-law to Oberg.

Lived in Ephraim 73 years and

personally knew the Becks and the Sevys.
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Testified that Becks and Sevys pastured animals on both
parcels 105 and 107 and that they had fences and gates that they
moved around.

(Tr. 386-387).
Wayne S e w

Son

of

Hespert

Sevy

and

brother

predecessors in title to disputed ground.

to

Robert

Sevy,

Testified he built hog

pens on parcel 107 and watered the pigs out of Cottonwood Creek.
(Tr. 396).
Testified does not even recall a fence when he raised
pigs

there

property.

in

1977, the

same year

the

Obergs

purchased

the

(Tr. 399).
Testified that when his father owned both parcels 105 and

107, the livestock were free to roam over the entire parcels.

(Tr.

400) .
Testified he never saw anyone do any repairs to the
fence.

(Tr. 401).
Further, was not even sure there was a fence.

(Tr. 402) .

Kristi Hansen
A plaintiff in this action.

Testified that fence was in

total disrepair and children would play there and that the Obergs
never complained about the children being there.
C.

(Tr. 413).

Facts
1.

Plaintiffs

reside

in

Ephraim,

adjoining neighbors to Defendants. (R. 191-192).
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Utah,

and

are

2.

Defendants acquired their property in March 1976

from Kenneth M. Sevy and Sylvia L. Sevy by Warranty Deed dated
April 29, 1976, and recorded February 23, 1977, in the official
records of the Sanpete County Recorder. The real property conveyed
by said deed is described as follows:
Beginning at a point 1.00 chain West from the
Southwest corner of Block 30, Plat "A" Ephraim
City Survey, and running thence North 1.00
chain; thence West 1.58 chains; thence North
17 degrees 15 minutes West 7.40 chains; thence
North 64 degrees 3 0 minutes West 2.10 chains;
thence South 69 degrees West 1.15 chains;
thence South 3 0 degrees East 1.90 chains;
thence North 78 degrees 30 minutes East 0.92
of a chain; thence South 14 degrees East 2.58
chains; thence South 60 degrees East 0.90 of a
chain; thence South 3.80 chains; thence East
3.50 chains to the point of beginning.
Said property is also identified in the records of the
Sanpete County Recorder as parcel 105, Plat

"A", Ephraim City

Survey (R. 191, Exhibit 2) .
3.

Plaintiffs acquired their property by Warranty Deed

from Jack Lou Peterson and Kris W. Peterson, dated August 8, 1990,
recorded August 8, 1990, in the official records of the Sanpete
County Recorder.

The real property described in the deed received

by Plaintiffs is set forth below:
Beginning at a point 1.0 0 chain West and 1.0 0
chain North from the Southwest corner of Block
30, Plat "A" Ephraim City Survey, and running
thence West 1.58 chains; thence North 17
degrees 15 minutes West 3.3 0 chains; thence
East 2.62 chains, more or less; thence South
3.2 9 chains to the point of beginning.
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The foregoing parcel is also identified in the official
records of the Sanpete County Recorder as a part of Parcel 107,
Plat "A" Ephraim City Survey.
107).

(Hereinafter referred to as parcel

(R. 191, Exhibit 14).
4.

The above described parcels are contiguous to each

other and share a common boundary.

The first call of Hansens'

legal description (West 1.58 chains) is common to the second call
of Obergs' legal description.

The second call of Hansens' legal

description is, in part, common to the third call of the Obergs'
legal description.
5.

(R. 174, 175) .

There is a natural water course running through

Ephraim City known as Cottonwood Creek that crosses the two common
boundary lines between the parties' property so that a portion of
it runs through the area enclosed within Hansens' legal description
and a portion runs through the area enclosed within Obergs' legal
description (R. 174 and 192).
6.

Hansens' predecessors

in interest to parcel 107

after 1954 were as follows:
Owner

Dates of Ownership

Madonna P. Beck
F. Hespert Sevy
Robert P. Sevy
Oscar D. Peterson

1954-1963
1963-1970
1970-1980
1980-1983

Jack L. Peterson

1983-1990

7.

Obergs' predecessors in interest to parcel 105 after

1954 were as follows:
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Owner

Dates of Ownership

Madonna Beck
F. Hespert Sevy
Rosella P. Sevy

1958-1963
1963-1971
1971-1973

Kenneth M. Sevy

1976-1976

8.

Parcels 105 and 107 were under common ownership from

November 1958 when Madonna Beck owned both parcels until March
1970, when F. Hespert Sevy conveyed parcel 107 to his son Robert P.
Sevy (R. 193, Tr. 185, 187).
9.

Parcel 107 was not used for residential purposes by

any of Plaintiffs' predecessors in interest listed in paragraph 7
above.

Plaintiffs were the first to use parcel 107 for residential

purposes (R. 194).
10.
August 1990.
11.
of

a

large

Jack

Peterson

sold parcel

107 to Plaintiffs

(R. 193, Tr. 15, Exhibit 14).
The parties' respective properties were never part
parcel

of

ground

but

have

existed

descriptions/parcels for at least fifty (50) years.
12.

in

as

separate

(Tr. 184).

The parties' respective properties were under common

ownership from at least the 1950's until F. Hespert Sevy conveyed
the Hansen property to his son Robert P. Sevy in March of 1970.
(R. 193, Tr. 185, 187).
13.

The parties' predecessors in interest, Madonna Beck

and F. Hespert Sevy, during their separate periods of ownership,
used parcels 105 and 107 together to graze and raise livestock.
(R. 176, 194, Tr. 301).
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14.

At some time in the past, on a date that is unknown,

a fence was constructed that ran basically parallel to Cottonwood
Creek and which was located on parcel 107 and on the North side of
Cottonwood Creek (where it runs East and West) and also on the east
side of Cottonwood Creek (where it runs North and South).

(R. 176

and 194) .
15.

The

parties'

predecessors

in

interest

to

both

parcels 105 and 107 did not treat the fence as a boundary fence
(Tr. 297, 298, 400, 304, 315, 316 and 431).
16.

The only

repairs to the

fence by the parties'

predecessors in interest was for the purpose of livestock control
(Tr. 304, 82, 83, 92, 95, 56, 58).
17.

No one did any repairs to the fence from at least

1977 to 1990 (Tr. 92, 52, 56, 316, 401).
18.

In 1977 when the Obergs purchased their parcel 105,

the fence was in disrepair.

(R. 176 and Tr. 399, 402 and 403) . In

fact, Robert Sevy's brother, Wayne, raised pigs on the Hansen
property and watered them out of Cottonwood Creek and does not
recall a fence at all.
19.

(R. 177, 194 and Tr. 399, 402 and 403).

The fence was still in disrepair in 1990 when the

Hansens purchased their property.
20.

Oscar

Deloy

(R. 177).

Peterson

sold

the property

brother, Jack Lou Peterson, by the deed, and

to

his

showed him the

property line on the South side of Cottonwood Creek and not the old
fence line.

(Tr. 46 through 52).
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21.

Jack Lou Peterson sold parcel 107 to the Hansens by

the deed and showed Mr. Hansen where the boundary line was south of
Cottonwood Creek and not the old fence line (Tr. 16 and 17).
22.

The Obergs built a fence entirely on their north

deeded property line and located south across the Creek from the
old fence about 1983.

They later took the fence down (Tr. 54, 55,

56, 81, 82) .
23.

Madonna P. Beck and the Obergs used parcel 105 for

residential purpose.
24.

(R. 177 and 194).

The Hansens were the first owners listed herein to

use parcel 107 for residential purposes.
25.

(R. 177 and 197).

From the time the Hansens purchased the property in

1990 and moved a trailer on the property and up to 1992, the Hansen
children occupied those portions of parcel 107 and 105 in the area
of Cottonwood Creek and used that area for operation of ATV's and
for play activities.
26.

(R. 177 and 195).

Oberg put

"No Trespassing"

signs on his

fences

during the time Jack Lou Peterson owned parcel 107 but he never put
any signs on the old fence on parcel 105.
27.

(Tr. 85, 88-91) .

Oberg offered to purchase the disputed portion of

parcel 107 from the Hansens, at which time the parties' discussed
a survey and Oberg made no claim that the old fence was the
boundary.

(Tr. 19-20) .
28.

While Mr. Hansen was out of town in June of 1992 for

two (2) weeks to the Utah National Guard Summer Camp, Oberg had his
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employees build a new fence in approximately the same location as
the old fence, on the Hansen parcel 107.

(Record 178 and 179, 195

and 196).
29.

In June of 1992, Mr. Hansen's father, Thomas Hansen,

appeared at the property when Obergs' employees were starting the
construction of the new fence and asked them to stop.

(R. 179,

196) .
30.

In August of 1992, Mr. Oberg claimed the boundary

between parcels 105 and 107 is Cottonwood Creek and that he, Mr.
Oberg, would move the fence in the future as Hansens developed
their property.
31.

(R. 179, 197).
In March of 1992, Oberg built an irrigation pond

that is Northwest of the Hansen property and not close to the
property in dispute.
32.

(Tr. 22, 29-33).

In November of 1992, Hansens' counsel sent Oberg a

letter asking Mr. Oberg to vacate the Hansens' property, dismantle
the fence and desist from any further interference.
33.

(R. 180, 197) .

The new fence still stood on August 3, 1994.

(R.

180, 197) .
34.

There has never been a boundary between parcels 105

and 107 that qualified as a boundary by acquiescence.

(R. 180 and

197) .
35.

To the extent that there may have been a fence or

any other boundary between parcels 105 and 107, neither party has
acquiescenced in the monument as a boundary and Mr. Oberg built a
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fence between 1977 and 1983 that would interrupt any period of
acquiescence.

(Tr. 423, 432 and 454) .

36.

The Obergs have trespassed on the Hansens' property,

and the Hansens have employed the only means available to them to
prevent the continued trespass.

That means is this lawsuit.

(R.

180, 197).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The primary reason that Obergs' appeal should be rejected
is that they have failed to marshal the evidence as required by
Rule 52(a) , Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the case law decided
thereunder.

Obergs'

brief

consists

of

nothing

recitation of the evidence that Obergs believe
arguments.
evidence

more

than

a

supports their

Obergs have made no effort whatsoever to set forth the

that

supports Judge Mower's

Findings of Fact.

This

deficiency alone is sufficient to warrant denial of Obergs' appeal.
Hansen has marshalled the evidence in support of Judge
Mower's Findings of Fact.

The facts overwhelmingly support Judge

Mower's findings.
With respect to Obergs' claim that there was acquiescence
in the old fence by the parties and their respective predecessors
in title, the witnesses uniformly testified that the fence was in
total disrepair by 1977, when the Defendants purchased parcel 105.
The

witnesses

that

owned

the

property

prLor

to

the

parties

testified that they did not care about the location of the fence or
the boundaries

and

the predecessors
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in title permitted

their

livestock to roam freely upon both the Plaintiffs' and Defendants'
ground.

There simply was no testimony or evidence to support

Obergs' claim that there was acceptance of the fence as a boundary.
The disputed property was commonly owned from at least
1958 to 1970 when Hespert Sevy deed the parcel 107 to his son
Robert Sevy.

Even then, Mr. Sevy did not care where the boundary

was nor was the old fence accepted as the boundary because the
livestock were free to roam the entire area, and his family owned
the adjoining property.
Obergs purchased parcel 105 in 1977 from another son of
Hespert Sevy, Kenneth Sevy.
parcel

Mr. Oberg claimed he used the part of

107 up to the old fence line during his ownership by

allowing his horses to chew down the grass there.

However, two of

the predecessors in title recall Oberg placing a fence upon what
they believed to be the true boundary and deeded line sometime in
1983.

Mr. Oberg showed he knew and accepted the true boundary by

his conversations with Mr. Hansen.

Mr. Oberg never regarded the

old fence as the property line, so he wants to rely solely on his
predecessors in title to show the long time of acquiescence to a
boundary it was his burden to establish.

There was simply no

testimony from any of the witnesses as to the purpose, use or
intent of the fence prior to 1954. From 1954 to 1977 the fence was
not recognized as a fence, let alone a boundary.
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Finally,

Judge

Mower,

as

a

trial

court

judge,

had

inherent equitable power to award reasonable attorney's fees when
he deemed it appropriate in the interest of justice and equity.
Utah Code Annotated § 78-27-56 does not require written
findings on the bad faith issue.

In fact, if the Court finds bad

faith and no merit to the actions of the losing party, the Court
then has no discretion and must award reasonable attorney's fees to
the prevailing party. Judge Mower substantively found that Obergs'
action was without merit and their defense was in bad faith.

There

is sufficient evidence in the record to indicate the basis of Judge
Mower's award of attorney's fee.

Mr. Oberg had built his first

fence on his deeded boundary line, took it down and then had his
employees trespass upon Hansens' property while Mr. Hansen was away
and build a fence upon Hansens' ground.

Oberg dug holes, tore down

trees and removed bushes and other vegetation as he trespassed upon
Hansens' property.

Mr. Hansen asked Oberg to quit trespassing and

doing damage to his property, but Oberg refused to even discuss the
matter and directed his employees to continue the construction of
the fence.
Mr. Hansen had his counsel write a letter to Oberg asking
him

to

remove

the

Plaintiffs' property.

fence

he

had

wrongfully

built

upon

the

Mr. Oberg refused.

Judge Mower presided over this lawsuit from beginning to
end and had an opportunity to view and judge the credibility of the
witnesses and the evidence.

Based thereon, Judge Mower awarded
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attorney's fees.

Such an award of attorney's fees is appropriate

for public policy reasons in that the law and the courts need some
means

to

make

the

Plaintiff

whole

when

inflicted by actions such as Obergs' .

they

suffer

damages

The Obergs should not be

allowed to trespass upon anyone's property at will, destroy trees
or build fences, thinking that they will be shielded from having to
pay the total cost of making the victim of their actions whole.
Attorney's fees are part of the damages suffered by the prevailing
party, they cannot be made whole without recovery of those fees.
Actions by others similarly situated to the Obergs' need to be
discouraged and an award of attorney's fees should be affirmed as
a signal to others that bad faith litigation is a burden on both
courts and prevailing parties and the costs of such action will be
borne by the bad faith litigant.
Argument
I.

Obergs' Challenge to Judge Mower's Findings of Fact Should be
Rejected Because Obergs have Failed to Marshal the Evidence in
Support of the Findings of Fact.
Under Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Obergs'

challenge to Judge Mower's Findings of Fact will fail unless they
can establish that the findings are "clearly erroneous".

In order

to meet this burden, Obergs are required to marshal the evidence in
support of Judge Mower's Findings of Fact and demonstrate that
despite

the

erroneous.

supporting

evidence,

the

findings

are

clearly

Utah Department of Social Services v. Adams, 806 P.2d
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1193,

1197 (Ut. App. 1991); Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v.

Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 553 (Ut. App. 1989).
Obergs have failed to marshal the evidence in support of
the

findings

as required.

Obergs' brief

simply reargues the

evidence that Obergs believe supports their view of the case.
This Court recently stated how carefully appellants must
marshal evidence and why appellate courts will not give a moment of
consideration to those who do not.
Utah appellate courts do not take courts'
factual findings lightly. We repeatedly have
set forth the heavy burden appellants must
bear when challenging factual findings.
To
successfully appeal a trial court's findings
of fact, appellate counsel must play the
devil's advocate. "[Attorneys] must extricate
[themselves] from the client's shoes and fully
assume the adversary's position. In order to
properly discharge the [marshaling duty]...
the challenger must present, in comprehensive
and fastidious order, every scrap of competent
evidence introduced at trial which supports
the very findings the appellant resists."
Oneida v. Oneida Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 1051,
1052-53 (Ut. App. 1994) (emphasis added; emphasis of "supports" in
original; extensive citations omitted).
The Oneida court also articulated the appellant's postmarshalling duty under the "rigorous", clearly erroneous standard:
Once appellants have established every
pillar supporting their adversary's position,
they then "must ferret out a fatal flaw in the
evidence" and show why those pillars fail to
support the trial court's findings. They must
show the trial court's findings are "so
lacking in support as to be 'against the clear
weight of the evidence', thus making them
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'clearly erroneous'." Id., at 1053 (emphasis
added; citations omitted).
In the instant case, Obergs did precisely the opposite
from marshalling—they recite and discuss only the evidence on
which they relied at trial.

They altogether ignored Hansens'

compelling evidence supporting the denial of Obergs' frivolous
defense of boundary by acquiescence and the award of attorney's
fees.

Indeed, Oneida might have been describing Obergs' failure of

their duties:
Oneida has failed to marshal the evidence
in support of the trial court's factual
findings. Rather than bearing its marshaling
burden, Oneida has merely presented carefully
selected facts and excerpts of trial testimony
in support of its position.
Such selective
citation to the record does not begin to
marshal the evidence; it is nothing more than
attempting to reargue her case before this
court--a tactic that we reject.
Id. , at
1053(emphasis added; citations omitted).
Obergs, as did the Oneida appellant, failed their twofold duty to demonstrate how the trial court found the facts from
the evidence and why those findings contradict the weight of the
evidence supporting the award.

Id., at 1054.

The Oneida court had no trouble affirming the district
court without analysis of the arguments raised on appeal.
Because Oneida has failed to marshal the
evidence
supporting
the
trial
court's
findings, we hold that those findings are
accurate
and
affirm
the
trial
court's
dismissal based on those findings.
As we decline to consider the merits of
Oneida's appeal, we take the occasion to
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further articulate our rationale behind the
marshaling requirement. . . .
Id., at 1053 (emphasis added; citations omitted); see also, e.g.,
Allred v. Allred, 835 P.2d 974 (Ut. App. 1992) (appellate court
affirmed

without

comment

because

appellant

failed

to

marshal

evidence).
Because of Obergs' failure to marshal the evidence, their
challenge to Judge Mower's Findings of Fact should be dismissed
without further consideration.

"When the duty to marshal is not

properly discharged, we refuse to consider the merits of challenges
to the findings and accept the findings as valid."

Mountain States

Broadcasting, supra, 783 P.2d 553.
II.

The Testimony and Evidence Produced at Trial Support Judge
Mower's Findings of Fact.
Obergs argue that their title to the disputed property

became perfected under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence
prior to the time Hansens acquired a deed to their property which
included

the

disputed

property.

To

advance

this

argument.

Mr. Oberg quotes himself and then refers to only two one-line
statements made by Mr. Robert Sevy in support of his argument.
Obergs totally ignore the other testimony and evidence Judge Mower
considered in arriving at his decision as set forth above in the
summary of the testimony presented at trial.
The elements of a boundary by acquiescence are:
(1) Occupation up to a visible line
marked by monuments, fences, or buildings, (2)
mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary,
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(3) for a long period
adjoining land owners.

of

time,

(4)

by

Englert v. Zane, 848 P.2d 165, 168 (Ut. App. 1993).
Utah courts have always restrictively
applied this doctrine. A party claiming title
by acquiescence must establish all of the
required
elements
to
give
rise
to
a
presumption of ownership in his or her favor.
Id. , at 168-169 (citations omitted) . Obergs failed to carry their
burden of establishing at least elements (1), (2) , and (4) . Obergs
failed to show occupation of the disputed parcel or even that the
fence was sufficiently visible to demark any line or barrier.
There is no showing of mutual acquiescence in the old fence line as
a boundary

line.

There

is no showing of why the

fence was

originally constructed or any of the use of the fence except for
the purpose of holding livestock.

The earliest evidence regarding

the use of the fence occurred while both the Obergs' and Hansens'
property were owned by the same owner.

There is no evidence that

any party treated the fence as a boundary line at any time in the
past.

Hansens presented evidence showing that the old fence line

was not regarded as the property line by him or his predecessors in
interest. Finally, because Obergs presented no evidence of any use
of the property or the fence line prior to the 1950's, and since
both Obergs' and Hansens' property were under common ownership
until

1970, Obergs have failed to show an agreement

as to a

boundary between adjoining land owners over any sufficient period
of time to constitute boundary by acquiescence.
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In Leon v. Dansie, 639 P.2d 730 (Utah 1981), the Utah
Supreme Court upheld a finding of no boundary by acquiescence in a
case involving a fence used to contain livestock.

The Court

stated:
The defendants have set forth in their
brief, only isolated parts of testimony
favoring
their
contentions,
emphasizing
existence of a fence for a long time. There
was no showing of the important continuity of
use factor, and no proof positive of any
mutual acquiescence that the fence was or was
intended to be a boundary.
The trial court
reasonably
could
have
recognized
and
apparently did recognize such insufficiency in
the evidence.
Id. , at 731.

The Obergs failed to establish that the old fence

line was used as a boundary or was placed to settle any uncertainty
about the location of the boundary.

The mere fact that a fence

happens to be put up and neither party does anything about it for
a long period of time will not establish it as the true boundary.
Ringwood v. Bradford, 2 Ut. 2d 119, 121, 269 P.2d 1053 (1954).
It is not to be questioned that if an
owner of property puts up a fence simply as a
barrier to separate one part of his property
from the other, for some purpose of his own
convenience, such as to confine animals in a
pasture, or to keep them out of certain areas,
such a fence is properly referred to as a
barrier, and not as a boundary. The period of
time that a fence exists under such circumstances as a barrier will not constitute part
of the "long period of time" requisite to
establish a boundary by acquiescence. On the
other hand, if the property on either side of
such a fence is conveyed to separate parties,
so that there comes into being separate ownership of the tracts on either side, and the
circumstances are such that the party should
reasonably be assumed to accept the fence as
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the boundary between their properties, thence
from that time on, the time during which the
fence continues to exist, should be regarded
as going toward fulfilling the time requirement for establishment of a boundary by
acquiescence.
Baum v. Defa, 525 P.2d 725 (Ut. 1974).

During all the time the

properties were in joint ownership, no boundary by acquiescence
could accrue.

Obergs failed to show circumstances in which the

parties would reasonably be assumed to accept the fence as a
boundary.

Some owners did not even know there was a fence there.

The Hansens' predecessors, Oscar Peterson, Jack

Peterson, and

Robert Sevy all believed that the true boundary was in or near the
creek.

They did not acquiescence in the fence as a boundary.
There was evidence presented that the property of Hansens

and Obergs was previously

commonly owned or owned by closely

related family members, and while commonly owned both parcels were
used as one big pasture and that livestock freely roamed over the
entire property.

(Robert Sevy, Tr. 301-319); (Ted Peterson, Tr.

348); (Wayne Sevy, Tr. 396, 399, 400).
Obergs' own witness, Mr. Ted Peterson, testified that
when he cleaned Cottonwood Creek in the 1940's the fence was in
disrepair, worn out and torn down.

(Tr. 351 and 352).

In fact, there was no evidence presented by either party
as to the purpose, intent or use of the property or the fence prior
to 1954 when the Becks owned both parcels.
In fact, the Court brought to a head the very question of
acquiescence by predecessors in interest to the property at the
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close of the trial in a discussion with Obergs' counsel (see Tr.
440-442).

Judge Mower made a finding that there has never been a

boundary between parcels 105 and 107 that qualified as a boundary
by acquiescence (R. 197).

Further, to the extent that there may

have been a fence or any other boundary between parcels 105 and
107, there was no acquiescence in it by the parties to this action.
(R. 197) .
Obergs failed at trial to show any evidence as to the
acquiescence in the fence as a boundary by anyone.

They simply

claimed there was an old fence and it ought to be the boundary.
They make the same claim again on appeal.

Because the trial

court's decision is amply supported by the evidence, the judgment
of the trial court should be affirmed.
III. Judge Mower Substantively Found that Obergs' Action
Without Merit and Their Defense was in Bad Faith.
In most

cases, attorney's

fees

are

awarded

authorized by a statutory or contractual provision.

only

was
if

In this case,

although not specifically stated in the findings, the trial court
substantively found Obergs' actions to be without merit and that
their defense was in bad faith.

There is sufficient evidence in

the record and transcript in support of the award of attorney's
fees pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-27-56, under which Judge
Mower was required to award attorney's fees if Obergs' claim has no
merit and is in bad faith.
Oberg cites Baldwin v. Barton, 850 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1993)
for the general proposition that an award of attorney's fees is
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appropriate only if authorized by statute or contract.

Yet the

Baldwin court, per Chief Justice Hall, upheld the trial court's
award

of

attorney's

fees

pursuant

to

§

76-27-56,

Utah

Code

Annotated, even though the trial court had not indicated a legal
basis for its conclusion.

Id., at 1198.

Justice Hall went into

the record and transcript to find the facts on which the trial
court based its decision.
Appellate review of a "without merit" determination is a
question of law that will be reviewed for correctness.
On the other hand, a "bad faith" determination is a
question of
standard.

fact and is reviewed under the clearly

erroneous

Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202 (Ut. App. 1991).
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "[I]n the absence

of a statutory or contractual authorization, a court has inherent
equitable power to award reasonable attorney's fees when it deems
appropriate in the interest of justice and equity."

Steward v.

Utah Public Service Comm'n, 885 P.2d 759, 782, (Utah 1994).

See

also Jensen v. Bowcut, 261 Utah Adv. Rep. 16, 19 (Ut. App. 1995)
wherein the Court of Appeals per Justice Greenwood upheld an award
of attorney's fees based on the principles of equity and justice as
they related to the specific circumstances of that case.
In the instant case, Obergs trespass upon the Hansens'
property and their destruction of trees and vegetation compelled
Hansens to bring this action.

(R. 195) .
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Obergs continued their trespass in spite of Hansens'
protests while Mr. Hansen was out of town serving in the Utah
National Guard.

(Tr. 35, 146 and 159).

Obergs agreed

to move their fence in the

Hansens developed their property.

future as

(R. 197).

In November of 1992, Hansens' counsel

sent Obergs a

letter asking them to vacate Hansens' property, dismantle the fence
and desist from any further interference.

(R. 197).

The fence still stood at the time of trial in this
matter.

(R. 197).
Obergs' counsel said this whole matter was over a grudge

between the parties and that the parties should not even be here.
(Tr. 450) .
There is ample evidence in the record and the transcript
to support the trial court's award of attorney's fees, and due
deference is owed to Judge Mower who actually presided over the
proceeding and has firsthand familiarity with the litigation. Utah
Dep't of Social Services v. Adams, 860 P.2d 1193 (Ut. App. 1991).
The record also supports Judge Mower's findings that
there is no factual or legal justification for Obergs' actions.
Judge Mower found that "there has never been a boundary
between parcels
acquiescence."

105 and

107 that qualified

(R. 197) (emphasis added).

as a boundary by

Judge Mower also found

that "to the extent that there may have been a fence, or any other
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boundary between parcels 105 and 107, there was no acquiescence in
it by the parties to this action.
Obergs

simply

failed

(R. 197) (emphasis added).
to

provide

evidence

remotely

sufficient to support their defense of this action on the theory of
boundary by acquiescence.

Obergs offered no proof at trial and

cannot point to any proof on appeal.

This whole appeal is Obergs'

continuation of their grudge with Hansens over a piece of ground
that Mr. Oberg claims has no value.

(Tr. 276 and 277).

Judge Mower awarded attorney's fees when he made his oral
findings.

(Tr. 456 and 457) . Judge Mower awarded attorney's fees

when he drafted his own Findings of Fact and Decision.
181).

(R. 172 and

Judge Mower awarded attorney's fees in the Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law.

(R. 190 and 197) .

Judge Mower awarded

attorney's fees in the Judgment and Order that he signed.

(R. 199

and 2 00) .
Obergs filed a Motion to Amend Judgement and a Memorandum
in Support making the same arguments he has on appeal.
through 187). Judge Mower denied their motion.

(R. 182

(R. 216). Judge

Mower has stayed firm in his award of attorney's fees.
Judge Mower had a firsthand look at Obergs' case, the
facts and the evidence presented, and found that their defense of
Hansens' actions had no basis in law or fact and therefore was
without merit.
The award of attorney's fees should be upheld by this
Court, and Obergs should be assessed attorney's fees and costs on
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this frivolous appeal, particularly in light of their total failure
to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's ruling.
There is no evidence in the record that Obergs had an honest belief
in their claim.

Obergs intended to and did take unconscionable

advantage of Hansens and

knew this suit would cause Hansens

monetary damage they could ill afford.

(Tr. 3 94).

CONCLUSION
The evidence supports the Findings of Fact that Obergs
challenge.

Judge Mower correctly determined that there was never

any acquiescence in the fence as a boundary by predecessors or by
the parties.

Judge Mower had an opportunity to see and evaluate

the witnesses and evidence.

The evidence supports Judge Mower's

award of attorney's fees because of the meritless and bad faith
defense by Obergs, and because of the Court's inherent equitable
powers.
Last but perhaps more importantly, Obergs totally failed
to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's judgment,
thereby requiring Hansens to do so, and on that basis alone their
appeal in its entirety should be dismissed.
For the foregoing reasons, Hansens respectfully request
that this Court affirm the judgment of the trial court, and award
them their costs and attorney's fees on this appeal.

-36-

DATED this /jjp

day of October, 1995.
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